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Article 7

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE PROPOSALS
CONCLUSION

The mass conspiracy case presents serious procedural due process problems,
and requires careful control by the trial court with the cooperation of prosecution and defense counsel.
The prosecution must recognize that its use of the mass trial as an enforcement weapon carries with it many obligations.
Defendants must recognize the practical benefits of working together and
of giving up technical rights to protect their common interests.
Both sides must recognize the necessity of alerting the trial court to anticipated problems, and of bringing the court more and more into the adversary byplay of the trial, so that rulings can be made which will protect the interests of all.
Of course, the basic problem of the mass trial is the inability of the defendant to control his own defense, with the threat of confusion of evidence
always present. For this reason few defendants will ever consider the mass trial
as satisfactory as the individual trial. However, the interests of defendants can
be better protected without real harm to the public, by the adoption of safeguards to insure procedural due process.
III. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE PROPOSALS TO CURB
ORGANIZED CRIME
Monrad G. Paulsen*
The Attorney General's program aimed at curbing organized crime raises
more important questions of draftsmanship and legislative policy than it does
the issues of civil liberties.' The legislation does not mount a heavy attack upon
the protections of those accused of a crime.
It is interesting to contrast the proposals of Attorney General Kennedy
with the kind of criminal procedure reforms that were sometimes advanced during the late 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's - another period in our
history when there was great concern over the ability of government to suppress
those who systematically make profit from criminal activity. There is no proposal today to facilitate criminal convictions by providing for majority vote
jury verdicts. There is no proposal to permit the prosecution to comment on the
defendant's failure to testify, to sanction the admission of prior convictions
into evidence as a part of the prosecution's case, to forbid bail to "known
criminals," to abolish the exclusionary evidence rule, to remove the right of a
prisoner to remain mute or to place "criminal hangouts" beyond the protection
of the fourth amendment.' It may be that the Attorney General was reluctant
to embark upon the certainly futile task of amending the Constitution, or it may
be that he felt the merits of the proposals offered were such as to achieve his
*
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objectives without more. Whatever the reason, a dispassionate judgment must
admit that questions of civil liberties are not the most important questions
which this legislation proposes.
It is instructive to consider the statements made by representatives of the
American Civil Liberties Union to the House and Senate Committees concerned
with the program designed to curb organized crime.' The objections were
largely reiterations of positions previously taken, and which, as a matter of
existing constitutional law, are lost. The Union was disturbed about the proposed extension of immunity legislation and about the problem of double
jeopardy which arises when both the federal and state governments can punish
what is essentially the same course of conduct. In addition, the organization
noted its concern that sports reporting would be discouraged because of the
bill banning the use of wire facilities for the transmission of betting information;
that the travel bill would restrict the freedom to travel and that conspiracy
charges would be the source of abuse. The statements also express distress that
some of the statutes are imprecise and hence raise the due process issue of void
for vagueness. They opposed the extension of federal power to repress acts
which have historically been left to state action. Yet, one is impressed by the
relative mildness of the organization's objections. The Union did not sound
the alarm that new dangers to freedom were inherent in the proposed legislation.
However, to say that the program to curb organized crime does not primarily raise civil liberties issues or that it does not place before us massive new
issues is not to say that civil liberties issues are lacking.
I.

IMMUNITY LEGISLATION PROPOSED

Two of the points raised by the American Civil Liberties Union seem
especially important: first, that immunity legislation, designed to induce the
testimony of those involved in some aspects of a crime under investigation,
should not be extended; and second, that successive prosecutions for essentially
the same acts should not be possible under state and federal laws.
The proposed extension of immunity legislation reminds us again of the
undesirable aspects of such statutes. An immunity statute does not give a witness protection equivalent to that given by the right of silence. Men who stand
exposed as criminals by their own statements are sure to suffer the loss of community respect. They may lose their jobs or the love and comfort of a family.
They are protected against a criminal conviction; they are not protected
against a criminal reputation. The statutes prevent a conviction, not a prosecution. Indeed, what a witness is compelled to say may, as a practical matter,
provide the basis for a subsequent investigation and conviction in respect to
matters other than those under investigation. Immunity legislation ought to
insulate the witness against both state and federal criminal prosecutions.
If fifth amendment protection has an important position in the fabric of
3 Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. on the
Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering pages 46-57 (1957);
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 16, 380-386 (1961).
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civil liberties, immunity legislation should be adopted cautiously
instances where the need for information is clearly imperative.

-

only in

Two PROSECUTIONS FOR A SINGLE ACT
The double jeopardy problem presented by the crime-curb program is a
very real one. Suppose a person who travels from New Jersey to Pennsylvania
is apprehended by the Pennsylvania police in a gambling establishment. Suppose
further, that this person is found not guilty in a state prosecution for carrying
on the gambling enterprise because of insufficient proof connecting the accused
with the business. Federal officers charged with racket control may be as
sharply disappointed at the outcome as the responsible police in the state. Thereafter officers might search for more evidence. The prosecuting officials could rethink the strategy and technique of the prosecution. They may hope for
better luck with a federal jury. If our defendant-traveler is brought to trial in
the federal courts, he may be charged, under the Attorney General's program,
with traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate the carrying! on of an unlawful
business enterprise. The fact of his acquittal by the state will not operate as
a bar.
The leading modem cases on the question whether state and federal prosecutions for the same acts violate the Constitution of the United States are
Bartkus v. IllinoisO and Abbate v. U.S.5 In Bartkus, the defendant was first
tried in a federal court for violation of a federal statute punishing the robbery
of banks insured by FDIC. Bartkus was acquitted in this prosecution. Shortly
thereafter he was brought to trial by the state under an Illinois statute on a
charge of robbing the same bank involved in the federal case. In a 5-4 decision,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the Illinois conviction.
Prior cases justified the Court's opinion. In U.S. v. Lanza,' the Court had
held that a federal prosecution might take place on the same facts which had
been the basis of a state conviction on the ground that each sovereign must
have the power to punish for the violation of its laws.
The Court's opinion in Bartkus reflected some practical as well as historical
considerations. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion, expressed fear that,
"Were the federal prosecution of a comparatively minor offense to prevent state
prosecution of so grave an infraction of a state law the result would be a shocking
II.

and untoward deprivation . . ." of the historic duties of a state to maintain

peace and order.7 Conversely, it would undercut federal power if the states
could immunize against federal prosecutions by a prior state conviction. The
extent to which a state or the federal government should yield this duty in
order to protect accused persons against double prosecution was said to be a
matter for each government to resolve for itself by appropriate legislation.
The facts of Bartkus, as set forth in Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion,' illustrate in its sharpest form a danger that can arise when one course
4 359 U.S. 21 (1959).
5 359 U.S. 186 (1959).
6
7
8

260 U.S. 377 (1922).
359 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 164.
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of conduct can give rise to successive prosecutions. He pointed out that the
federal officers were greatly disturbed by the federal acquittal. The trial judge
was openly critical of the jury when its verdict was announced. Federal officers
solicited the state indictment and secured additional evidence against the defendant and placed it at the disposal of the Illinois State's Attorney. In his
view, "the federal officers engineered the second prosecution and on this second
try obtained the desired conviction." 9
Mr. Justice Black's dissent is rooted in the assertion that the fear of bringing
persons to trial twice for the same conduct is "one of the oldest ideas found in
western civilization. . . . [D]ouble prosecutions for the same offense are . . .
contrary to the spirit of our country."'" He was unpersuaded by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's argument. If the state were to subvert federal policy by imposing
inadequate penalties in criminal cases, Congress could preempt the field of
federal concern by giving the federal establishment a monopoly of prosecutorial
power or by establishing minimal penalties applicable in both court systems.
In Abbate, the defendant had been found guilty in Illinois of conspiring
to destroy the property of another. After a plea of guilty and a three months'
sentence in the state proceeding, the defendants were found guilty a second time,
now in a federal court for a conspiracy to destroy a part of a communications
system operated or controlled by the United States. Once more, the Lanza
principle was accepted without serious question by the majority. Mr. Justice
Black, the Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, saying in part,
"It is just as much an affront to human dignity and just as dangerous to human
freedom for man to be punished twice for the same offense, once by a State
and once by the United States, as it would be for one of these two Governments
to throw him in prison twice for the same offense.""
The mere fact that there are two sovereigns does not lessen the impact
upon a defendant of two prosecutions, two convictions or a conviction after
an acquittal.
The Attorney General's program does not embrace legislation forbidding
second prosecutions under state law for the same course of conduct which has
formed the basis of a federal prosecution. Nor is it forbidden to institute a
federal prosecution after a state case has been concluded respecting the same
matter. Abuses arising from harassment due to successive trials are remitted
to prosecutorial discretion for their solution.
The situation is covered by a policy statement from the Department of
Justice respecting successive prosecutions announced a few days after the decision
in Abbate and Bartkus.
In two decisions on March 30, 1959, the Supreme Court of the
United States reaffirmed the existence of a power to prosecute a
defendant under both federal and state law for the same act or acts.
That power, which the Court held is inherent in our federal system,
has been used sparingly by the Department of Justice in the past.
The purpose of this memorandum is to insure that in the future
we continue that policy. After a state prosecution there should
9 Id. at 169.
10 Id. at 151.
11 359 U.S. at 203.
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be no federal trial for the same act or acts unless the reasons are
compelling...
...I doubt that it is wise or practical to attempt to formulate
detailed rules to deal with the complex situation which might develop, particularly because a series of related acts are often involved.
However, no federal case should be tried when there has already
been a state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts without
the United States Attorney first submitting a recommendation to
the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in the Department. No
such recommendation should be approved by the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Division without having it first brought to
my attention.12
III.

THE

DISCRETION OF THE PROSECUTOR

The discretion of the prosecutor is, of course, of immense importance in
estimating the practical impact of any program of law enforcement. The abuse
of prosecutorial discretion can create civil liberties problems where none would
exist. The Attorney General's program provides an opportunity for abuse because not all violators of the law's letter are to be prosecuted and because the
program is aimed at a narrow group of persons - and sometimes one suspects
at specific individuals.
The purpose of the Fugitive Felon Act is not to secure federal convictions.
The Attorney General himself has said that its purpose "is to help and assist
the States . . . . not to try to gain jurisdiction ourselves. .

.

. In the last five

years, we picked up somewhere around 5,500 individuals, and we have only
prosecuted 25 of them."'"
The legislation forbidding travel in aid of an unlawful enterprise is apparently not designed for full enforcement. All violators are not to be prosecuted.
Attorney General Kennedy was candid on the point when House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Cellers put examples to him of petty actions which
might be punishable by the five years of imprisonment.
As I say, the Department of Justice, or law enforcement people,
are going to have to use and always have to use every day, every
hour, some discretion.
The Federal Government, I think, has used discretion in the
past in matters such as this - again including the example that you
gave including the fact that in many states gambling is illegal; yet
people in their own homes are playing cards and betting.
You don't have law enforcement people who are coming by and
ringing the doorbell and arresting them. That kind of 14thing is not
going on because that is not the intention of the statute.
In my view, legislation which is so drafted that a large number of persons
may fall into the net of which only a few will be punished is legislation that
threatens civil liberties. Under such an arrangement, a defendant may go to
prison because of a prosecutor's decision that the defendant is an undesirable
12 Statement of Attorney General William P. Rogers, Press Release of United States Department of Justice, April 6, 1959.
13 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, p. 42 (1961).
14 Id. at p. 36.
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person and not because of a decision that prosecution should be undertaken in
order to deter or punish forbidden conduct.
Some discretion is, of course, inevitable and desirable but the exercise of
discretion ought not to be arbitrary or capricious. Some constitutional law
has been developing on this point which suggests that there are limitations on a
prosecutor's discretion flowing from the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The first important case respecting discrimination in the enforcement of a
5
criminal statute is Yick Wo v. Hopkins."
A Chinese was prosecuted in California for operating a laundry without the appropriate license. He responded
by saying that it was the practice in San Francisco to refuse licenses to Chinese
persons while licenses had been granted freely to Caucasians. Yick Wo was
nevertheless convicted. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
conviction upon the ground that the practical administration of the licensing
ordinance had made an arbitrary and unjust discrimination between persons
based solely on race.
The constitutional issues in Yick Wo were later faced in an interesting
1943 opinion of the District Court of Appeals of California, 1st District.16
There the defendant was tried and found gilty of perjury for making a false
statement in an affidavit of registration as an elector in California. The defendant
had asserted that his name was Sam Darcy and that his birthplace was New
York City. In fact, his name was Srool Dardeck and the place of his birth was
the Ukraine, Russia. He sought to introduce proof that he had been singled
out for prosecution for the sole reason that he was a communist. He offered to
show, through certain deputy county clerks, that hundreds of untrue statements
pertaining to birth and name were found in the records of San Francisco and
that in many instances registrants voluntarily or upon notice had corrected the
affidavits. The only prosecution instituted was directed against him. Further,
he offered to show that never before in the history of California had anyone
been prosecuted for perjury for filing a false affidavit of this sort where the
person, in fact, had been, as Dardeck was, a qualified elector.
The majority of the court rejected his argument by simply taking the
position that one may not prove himself innocent by showing others to be guilty.
Yick Wo was distinguished on the ground that Yick Wo had not charged that
he had been convicted because he was a Chinese, but that he had been refused
a license on account of his nationality. California officials were attempting to
keep Chinese from operating laundries; they were not singling out guilty Chinese
for criminal punishment.
The dissenting judge failed to be persuaded by the distinction, saying in
part:
The basic principle of our system of government is that our
people, including the weak, the outnumbered and the nonconformist
stand before the courts on the basis of equality with all other lit15 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
16 People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P. 2d 118 (1943). On this issue, generally,
see Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUB.
L. REv. 1103 (1961).
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igants. If the criminal process can be deliberately and intentionally
abused to prosecute a particular individual because he is a communist, not because of what he has done but because of his beliefs,
the fundamental cause for which we are now fighting a great war
becomes a hollow mockery. The protecting arm of the Fourteenth
prohibits prosecutions based on prejudice and perseAmendment
17
cution.
Darcy has not gone unchallenged in California. A 1960 case, People v.
Harris,"8 involved convictions for violations of the gambling laws. The trial
court rejected offers of proof designed to show that these statutes had been
enforced in such a way as to discriminate against Negroes. For example, the
defendants offered to show that during 1957 and 1958 a total of 358 Negroes
were arrested for gambling, while only 27 white persons were so arrested. The
defendants were nevertheless convicted.
The appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial basing its decision
on a principle said to be announced in Yick Wo v. Hopkins: "An actual discrimination arising from the method of administering a law is as potential in
creating a denial of equality of rights as discriminations made by law."' 9
In another 1960 case a Pennsylvania trial court raised the question whether
the equal protection clause had been violated by a police policy of enforcing
Sunday closing laws only against large retail establishments.2" Presumably the
police department had followed the policy because the personnel and money
available were not sufficient to support total enforcement. In spite of this assertion, the court issued an injunction. Discrimination in enforcement as a
"definite policy on the part of a public official" denied equal protection of the
laws to the plaintiff retailer.
In the 1962 case of Oyler v. Boles,2 the Supreme Court of the United
States hinted, if only by negative implication, that a fourteenth amendment
question may be raised if discrimination in prosecution is unjustifiable. In that
case, the Court rejected the defendant's contention that he had been the victim
of discrimination. However, a convincing showing had not been made. In rejecting the defendants' argument, the Court said, "Even though the statistics
in this case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that
the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion or other arbitrary classification." 22
The most thorough discussion of the point that the arbitrary exercise of
discretion may establish a defense to a charge of crime is found in a recent case
in the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, decided February
22, 1962.3 Upon a charge of unlawfully making sales on Sunday in violation
of the New York Penal Law, the defendant attempted to show that the prosecution was a part of a discriminatory pattern aimed at the defendant and others
17 59 Cal. App. at 359, 139 P. 2d at 129.
18 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Reptr. 852 (1962).
19 182 Cal. App. 2d at 842, 5 Cal. Reptr. at 856.
20 Bargain City v. Dilworth, 29 U.S.L. Week 2002 (Pa. C.P. June 10, 1961).
21 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). See also, Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588-589 (1961).

22
23

368 U.S. at 456.

People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co. 12 A.D. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 128, (1962).
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engaged in the operation of "cut-rate" drugstores. Those not featuring a cutrate policy remained unmolested on Sunday.
The Appellate Division formulated a principle based on Yick Wo v. Hopkins.
Laxity in enforcement or mere nonenforcement against others are in themselves
insufficient to establish the unlawful exercise of discretion; however, intentional
discrimination against a particular defendant would establish a defense. The
court drew an analogy between the defendant's position in such a case and the
defense of entrapment. The opinion accepted the principle of the dissenters
in the leading entrapment case of Sorrells v. United States. 4 According to that
opinion, judges should embrace a policy of not applying the criminal law to
cases of crimes illegally induced by police officials. In like manner, when a
court finds a purposefully discriminatory prosecution, without justification,
the court itself should quash the action in order to vindicate the constitutional
right of a defendant against governmental overreaching. "The question," the
Appellate Division said, "is rather whether in a community in which there
is general disregard of a particular law with the acquiescence of the public
authorities, the authority should be allowed sporadically to select a single defendant or a single class of defendants for prosecution because of personal
animosity or for some other illegitimate reason." 25
In the recent court cases where a defense of discriminatory enforcement has
been recognized, the persons victimized were discriminated against because
they were members of a class which was the object of unequal treatment. They
were not prosecuted because they were disliked individuals.
Furthermore, in the New York drugstore case, the policy of enforcement
presumably had no relation to the proper enforcement of the criminal law.
Such a statement cannot be made against a policy of enforcement which aims
at getting the "king pins," the "top men" or the "big wheels" which run the
"syndicates." Nevertheless, "big wheels," "top men" and "king pins" are not
easy to identify. Their position may be nothing more than the result of widely
held opinion on the part of police that they are "involved" in criminality and that
for some reason their criminal activities are so successfully hidden that they cannot be proven.
For example, a leading New York labor leader recently died. His obituary
pointed out his underworld role, the many criminal trials in which he had
been a defendant, and the fact that he had never been convicted. Presumably,
he would be a target of selective law enforcement.
The kind of law enforcement attitude which sparks a wide-ranging search
for a basis of prosecution against a certain person can be illustrated by two
quotations, one from a former high-ranking official of the Justice Department
and the other a former law teacher and judge. First:
What we need to fight them, we feel in the Department of Justice,
is a long-range, permanent plan built into the Department of Justice.
We also attach to that the idea of looking at individuals, picking the
top hundred, and attacking them by looking at everything they do,
24
25

287 U.S. 435 (1932).
12 A.D. 2d at 17, 225 N.Y.S. 2d at 133.
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rather thari looking to see if they violate the narcotics law, or
looking to see if they violate the Hobbs Racketeering Act. We are
looking at everything they do, and we are coming up with evidence
of antitrust violations where they have crept into business.2 6
And secondly:
It is the duty of the prosecution attorney to enforce all criminal
laws regardless of his own judgment of public convenience or safety.
Compromises and "bargain days"in criminal courts lead to disrespect
for law because this process conflicts with enforcement of law.
Contradiction. It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to solve
the problem of public order and safety using the criminal code as
an instrument rather than as a set of commands. This makes it
proper and necessary that some laws should be enforced, others occasionally enforced, and others ignored according to the best judgment of the enforcing agency. The criminal problem must be looked
at as a war on dangerous individuals and not as a law enforcement
problem, unless we want to escape from reality by taking refuge in
an ideal world27 of false assumptions concerning both criminal codes'
and criminals.

Indeed, we have examples of federal legislation being used against selected individuals. The Mann Act was passed with the purpose of repressing
the transportation of women in interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution. In the famous Caminetti case"8 the act was interpreted to forbid the interstate transportation of any woman for immoral purposes even though no commercial aspect appeared in the circumstances. The author of the note to Section 207.1 in Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Model Penal Code informs us that
the Caminetti interpretation of the Mann Act "has provided a means of imprisoning alleged 'racketeers' by showing that they take their girl friends on
trips to Florida." The writer goes on to say: "This is a technique that could
be easily turned against vulnerable individuals or groups."
The constitutional rules with respect to discriminatory enforcement of the
law have yet to be formulated authoritatively. But, for the moment, we might
reflect upon a part of the opinion in the Utica Drug case.
Furthermore, even if the enforcement of a particular law is selective,
it does not necessarily follow that it is unconstitutionally discriminatory. Selective enforcement may be justified when the meaning or
constitutionality of the law is in doubt and a test case is needed to
clarify the law or to establish its validity. Selective enforcement
may also be justified when a striking example or a few examples are
sought in order to deter other violators, as part of a bona fide
rational pattern of general enforcement, in the expectation that
general compliance will follow and that further prosecutions will
be unnecessary. It is only when the selective enforcement is designed to discriminate against the persons prosecuted, without any
against others, that
intention to follow it up by general enforcement
29
a constitutional violation may be found.
On principle, a prosecutor should not be able to prosecute infractions of
26 Anderson, What Price Conviction, A.B.A. SECT. OF CRIM. LAW PROCEEDINGS 42 (1958).
27 Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 52 YALE L. J., 1, 18
(1932).
28 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
29 12 A.D. 2d at 21, 225 N.Y.S. 2d at 136.
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a criminal statute against a certain class of persons and to fail to prosecute
another group unless the legislature could constitutionally have made the same
classification. The prosecutor's classificatory scheme in law enforcement ought
to be subject to the same equal protection limitations as a legislative design.
On principle, a classification which selects a single individual for special
treatment under the law is unconstitutional unless a bona fide law enforcement objective is likely to be reached by such a classification. If the Constitution is violated when Negroes, large retailers, or cut-rate drugstores are prosecuted discriminatorily, it is clear that a more serious violation occurs if only
John Doe is brought to book while all others are unmolested. Proof of unlawful discrimination against an individual may be difficult but it may well
be possible. The writer believes People v. Darcy was incorrectly decided.
Law enforcement which aims at supposedly bad men smacks of harassment and tyranny. When laws, generally formulated, are enforced only against
certain persons, the subjects of such enforcement not only have an equal protection argument to assert but also may protest that their position is similar to
someone who is subjected to unconstitutionally imprecise and vague legislation.
The principle of legality may be undercut by discriminatory enforcement.
In addition to constitutional limitation of prosecutorial discretion, self-limitation is possible. The prosecutor may announce rational criteria for limiting and
rationalizing federal criminal prosecutions. Five factors are listed in a wellknown article by Professor Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania.
Considering the vices of dual criminal jurisdiction, it is important
to develop definite criteria for limiting the number of federal prosecutions under criminal laws which are merely auxiliary to state law
enforcement. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
must work these out in detail for each offense, but in general it can
be said that federal action is justified in the presence of one or
more of the following circumstances: (1) When the states are
unable or unwilling to act; (2) When the jurisdictional feature,
e.g., use of the mails is not merely incidental or accidental to the
offense, but an important ingredient of its success; (3) When, although the particular jurisdictional feature is incidental, another
substantial federal interest is protected by the assertion of federal
power; (4) When the criminal operation extends into a number of
states, transcending the local interests of any one; (5) When it
would be inefficient administration to refer to state authorities a
complicated case investigated and developed on the theory of
federal prosecution."0
It is important to point out that to initiate prosecution against someone believed to be a particularly dangerous, undesirable or unsavory person is not
one of the criteria listed.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF A FAIR TRIAL

A fair trial implies a set of certain charges and the establishment of those
charges by evidence relevant to the accusation. The charge, not the bad character of the defendant, is to be proved. The crime-curb program creates prob30 Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's Discretion, 13 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 65, 73 (1948).
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lems relating to this ideal. A case brought under legislation unconnected with
the program against organized crime illustrates the issue.
In Rutkin v. United States,3 the defendant was convicted of wilfully avoiding the payment of income taxes. The conviction was based upon a demonstration to the jury that $250,000.00 had been obtained by extortion. The extorted
funds consisted of money paid the defendant in New Jersey by a citizen of that
state. The payments were made in response to the defendant's threat to use a
gun and to kill the victim and his family. The majority of the Supreme Court
saw the case simply as raising the issue of whether the unlawful gain constituted
taxable income and made an affirmative answer.
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for himself and three others
Justices Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas-pointed out that, under a prior decision,
embezzled money would not be taxable income inasmuch as the embezzler had no
bona fide l6gal claim to the money. Hence, Justice Black argued, one who extorts
does not receive income. He then went on to question the wisdom of the prosecution. "Today's decision," he said, "illustrates an expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction into fields of law enforcement heretofore wholly left to states and
local communities."32 He thought this tendency to give Washington more power
to punish purely local matters to be unwise:
[T]he overriding federal authority forces them to surrender control
over the manner and policy of construing and applying their own
laws. State courts not only lose control over the interpretation of
their own laws, but also are deprived of the chance to use the discretion vested in them by state legislatures to impose sentences in
accordance with local ideas. Moreover, state prosecutors are deprived of the all-important function of deciding what local offenders
should be prosecuted. Final authority to make these important decisions becomes located in the distant city of Washington,
D.C.
33
Here, as elsewhere, too many cooks may spoil the broth.
The remoteness of federal power and the centralizing effect of Rutkin
were not Mr. Justice Black's only concerns. He was also concerned with fairness
at the trial. "Moreover, I doubt if this expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction
can be carried on in a manner consistent with our traditional ideas of what
constitutes a fair trial in criminal cases." 34 He saw the ideal of a fair disposition
of criminal cases threatened in several ways. First, he was disturbed about the
problem of multiple prosecution for the same event. He was concerned with
the loss of equality which arises by the fact that federal penalty and the state
penalty may be quite different. For example, under the Mann Act, a man can
be imprisoned for five years because of conduct many states do not hold to be
criminal at all. Secondly, Mr. Justice Black was concerned about the confusion
of issues which may arise to undercut the defendant's right to be tried on a
specific charge unhampered by the prejudice. He was fearful that a defendant
may be convicted because he is thought to be a "bad man" or a "scoundrel."
In the course of trying Rutkin for income tax violation, the prosecution
31 343 U.S. 130.
32 Id. at 141.
33 Id. at 143.
34 Ibid.
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had been permitted to prove that money was received under threats of death.
"From the beginning to the end," Mr. Justice Black said, "the evidence in
this case was devoted to showing the lawless life Rutkin, Reinfeld and their
associates led from the 1920's to 1950, ranging from bootlegging to bribery
to gambling."3 5
The same dangers of using such inflammatory materials are possible in
proceedings instituted under some of the provisions of the Attorney General's
program.
A defendant charged under the Travel Ban Act, may find himself charged
with traveling "with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on . . . any
unlawful activity" (e.g., a business enterprise involving handling narcotics or
prostitution). He is likely to find that the case against him involves a sensational
and prejudicial demonstration of much lawbreaking. If the defendant is charged
with managing a business enterprise involving gambling, the prosecution is not
limited to a specific gambling enterprise carried on within a particular day.
The extent of the unlawful operation, the amount of money which has been
earned by the illegal enterprise, its relationship to other illegal enterprises, for
which no possibility of prosecution exists under the new federal law, can almost
certainly be admitted into evidence. In addition, the prior history of the business is relevant to the charge. The prejudicial effect of such testimony cannot
be denied.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the first reported case
brought under the Travel Ban Act, there were 15 defendants joined together for
prosecution.3 6 Defendants were joined in a prosecution charging violation of the
act, and aiding and abetting. We can be certain that the new legislation will
feed some of the problems which have been recognized in connection with mass
trials and in connection with conspiracy trials in general. The great danger of
tarring two or three persons with the black brush of some highly visible and
obviously guilty codefendants is very great. This is not of course a new problem
in respect to federal prosecutions. Complaints have been received against the
conspiracy charge and the mass trial for a long time. The new legislation
adds to a serious situation precisely because it is aimed at organized criminality.
V.

THE CALL TO ARmS

Finally, it must be said that there is something threatening to civil liberties
in the very atmosphere created by the push for the program to control organized
crime. Perhaps the crime situation is as serious as the Attorney General's arguments assert, but civil liberties do not flourish when the people believe that
drastic, uncompromising action is necessary. In wartime, we are tempted to
take short cuts.
Some of the language surrounding the crime-curb program has been a call
to armed crusading. Robert Kennedy has spoken of the "Enemy Within." In
testifying on behalf of the Justice Department proposals, he asserted, "If those
bills are enacted, the Department of Justice is going to be involved in a large35
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